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PROPERTY IN LABOUR AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT 
Claire Mummé 
*Forthcoming in Political Economy and Law Handbook, U. Mattei and J. Haskell, eds. 
(Edward Edgar, Fall 2015) 
 
 The employment relationship is generally conceived of as a creature of contract. 
Although employment regulation takes different forms in different countries, a contract 
of employment is at the core of all models.1 The employment contract is referred to as 
the ‘bedrock’ legal institution for the regulation of waged work, or as ‘the corner-stone 
of the edifice of labour laws’.2 The contract of employment is often depicted as 
providing the core conceptual features that define access to and the content of the 
various legal regimes that regulate labour and employment.3  
At the same time, the contractual regulation of work is often criticized. One of 
the most important critiques of regulating employment through a contractual frame is 
that it hides from view the inequality of bargaining power that exists between employers 
and employees. The argument of this paper is that a contractual framework obscures 
more than the inequality of bargaining power between the parties – it also obscures the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The regulation of labour and employment takes different forms in different countries and jurisdictions. 
These differences, as outlined by Mark Freedland, tend to turn on the degree to which the employment 
relationship is statutorily regulated, and the degree to which that statutory regime takes up the central role 
in the overall regulation of the employment contract. In some countries, for example, employment is 
primarily regulated through specific legal regimes, which either impose terms, rights and obligations 
between the parties, or create processes and procedures for collective bargaining of employment rights 
and responsibilities. In other countries, such as the United States, Canada and England, a core contractual 
common law model of employment law occupies a central regulatory role, which is supplemented by 
various statutory regimes, which are not highly integrated with that common law model. cf Mark 
Freedland, ‘Burying Caesar: What Was the Standard Employment Contract?’ in Harry Arthurs and 
Katherine Stone (eds), Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment 
(Russell Sage Foundation 2013). 
2 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’ in A Flanders and H A Clegg (eds) The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain: its History, Law and Institutions (Blackwell 1954) 45. 
3 Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris, ‘Towards a Comparative Theory of the Contractual 
Construction of Personal Work Relations in Europe’ (2008) 37(1) Industr L J 49; Simon Deakin, ‘The 
Many Futures of the Contract of Employment’ in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl and Karl 
Klare (eds), Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (OUP 2002) 177.  
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proprietary basis of the exchange. The employment contract is a legal mechanism 
designed to transfer wages and rights of control over workers’ capacity to labour. 
Conceived of in this way, the employment relationship is fundamentally a contest for 
control over property (labour power) waged through contract. For this reason, analysing 
the property parameters of the employment relationship opens up another window for 
examining the strengths and weaknesses of regulating employment through contract. 
As has long been recognized, the contract of employment depends on the 
commodification of labour power. And notwithstanding debates amongst political 
theorists and trade union activists about whether individuals should be viewed self-
owners, and whether it is possible to sell one’s capabilities without selling one’s self, 
the law does treat labour power as a commodity.4 There has been little research on the 
ways in which the law does so, however, for the simple reason that self-ownership of 
one’s laboring capacities is often taken as fact, as the starting premise for analysis, and 
treated as a necessary pre-condition for individual self-realization through contract.5 
Moreover, proprietary and contractual forms of regulating work are often presented as 
diametrically opposed: a proprietary method of labour regulation creates a relationship 
of slavery, in which the worker has no sovereignty over the self and cannot leave the 
relationship.6 By contrast, contract is presented as an institution of choice, in which the 
worker chooses to enter and retains the capacity to exit.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 cf John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ch.5 (first published 1689) 
<http://history.hanover.edu/texts/Locke/J-L2-001.html> accessed 1 January 2015; cf Karl Marx, Capital, 
Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy (first published 1867, Ben Fowkes tr, Penguin 1977) 270-280; 
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (first published 1944, Beacon Press 2001) 71-80; C B 
Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Clarendon Press 1962); 
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford UP 1988) at chapter 1; cf Paul O’Higgins, ‘Labour is Not 
a Commodity: an Irish contribution to international labour law’ (1997) 26 (3) Industr L J 225 (for the 
trade union history of the slogan). 
5 Pateman (n 4) 39-75. 
6 See sources infra n 50. 
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But an analysis of labour power as property, and its relationship to contract, 
emphasizes that both contract and property are enmeshed in the legal regulation of 
waged employment. Examining the ways in which the courts have given shape to 
individual’s proprietary rights over their labour power, and set the terms for its 
exchange, demonstrates that the limitations on employers rights of control are not 
inherent to the contractual form. Instead, they often depend on wider social processes, 
such as production methods, collective bargaining, and statutory regulation. Examining 
proprietary rights over labour power provides another window onto the malleability of 
the contractual form, and the degree to which political choices are made by courts and 
legislators in determining the terms of the employment relationship. 
This paper will investigate the relationship between labour power as property and 
contract in the regulation of employment. I will begin by outlining the background role 
property plays in normative arguments over the value of regulating work through 
contract, before laying out the more overt property-based claims that are made in 
regards to employment. I will then turn to examining the employment relationship as the 
sale, or more specifically, lease of labour power. To do so I will discuss the historical 
evolution of contractual limitations on employers’ rights of control over the 20th 
century, and the ways in which these limitations are now fraying. In particular, I will 
describe the development of the managerial prerogative from a property to a contract-
based interest, and the ways in which concepts of working-time have theoretically 
operated to separate in law the commodification of labour power from the 
commodification of self. Finally, I will conclude by examining the ways in which these 
limiting mechanisms are beginning to disappear, as collective bargaining protections 
dissipate and the statutory protections are rolled back. The result is, amongst other 
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things, the expansion of employers’ proprietary rights of control over workers labour 
power. To flesh out these arguments I will draw primarily from Canadian and English 
common law principles and legal history, but the analysis conceptually should hold 
across much of the common law world.	  
I. The Legal Content of the Employment Contract  
In legal terms, the contract of employment at common law is usually explained as a 
bilateral negotiated exchange between two parties equal in law, who determine mutually 
beneficial terms and conditions for organizing their relationship. It is thought of as an 
open-ended relationship of ongoing duration, in the sense that while some basic 
elements of the relationship will be set a priori, many are likely to shift over time.7 
Mark Freedland describes it as a single continuing contract, which is often explained as 
relational.8 The open-ended nature of the relationship is managed through the concept of 
the managerial prerogative, which allows the employer to direct and allocate work, and 
to adjust job tasks and schedules.9 As part of employers’ right to make decisions about 
the organization of their businesses, the managerial prerogative carves out a zone of 
unilateral employer action in which they may make changes to those terms of the 
employment contract that are not fundamental.10 Within that zone of unilateral employer 
decision-making, employers have an exclusive right of control over the direction of 
work, which is given effect in law through a series of implied contractual duties that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This is because the legal regulation of employment is built around a paradigm of long-term, ongoing 
employment, often referred to as the Standard Employment Relationship (SER). 
8 Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (OUP 2005) 20; Ian MacNeil, ‘Contracts: 
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract 
Law’ (1977-1978) 72 Nw U L Rev  854, 890. 
9 Rebecca Loudoun, Ruth McPhail, and Adrian Wilkinson, Introduction to Employment Relations 
(Pearson 2009) 26. 
10 Farber v Royal Trust Co (1997) 1 SCR 846 (Farber).  
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employee owes the employer, such as the duties of obedience, loyalty, fidelity, good 
faith and confidence.11  
The implied duties impose a series of obligations on employees, the breach of which 
gives rise to dismissal for cause.12 Employees must obey all lawful orders given to them 
by their employers by virtue of the duty of obedience.13 The duties of loyalty, fidelity 
and confidence stipulate that employees may not engage in competitive business with 
their employers during the life of their employment contract, may not make a secret 
profit from their employment duties, and may not divulge any confidential information 
or trade secrets imparted to them while on the job.14 Violation of these duties provides 
cause for dismissal, and in some cases, entitles the employer to an injunctions and/or 
damages. The primary implied duty that employers hold under Canadian law is the duty 
to provide reasonable notice of termination, absent cause for dismissal. Employees are 
said not to contract for their jobs, but rather for the right not to be dismissed without 
cause or reasonable notice.15 For this reason, the primary claim available to employees 
dismissed without cause is a wrongful dismissal claim for reasonable notice damages. 
The wrongful dismissal claim is framed around what Freedland calls the 
wrongfulness/damages nexus, in which the only wrong from dismissal is the failure to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 cf Innis Christie, Geoffrey England and Brent Cotter, Employment Law in Canada (Butterworths 1993) 
484-86 (for a general description of the implied duties in Canada). 
12 In Canada, Justice Schroeder’s comment in dissent in Regina v Arthurs, Ex Parte Port Arthur 
Shipbuilding Co (1967) 2 OR 49 (CA) (Arthurs) is often quoted as the standard expression of cause for 
dismissal. If an employee has been guilty of serious misconduct, habitual neglect of duty, incompetence 
or conduct incompatible with his duties, or prejudicial to the employer's business, or if he has been guilty 
of wilful disobedience to the employer's orders in a matter of substance, the law recognizes the 
employer's right summarily to dismiss the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court adopted a 
proportionatlity analysis in McKinley v. BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38 which examines whether the misconduct 
raises to a level such that it gives rise to a breakdown in the relationship. 
13 Pearce v Foster et al (1886) 17 QBD 536 (Eng); Spain v Arnott (1817) 2 Stark 256 (Eng); Callo v 
Brouncker (1831) 4 C & P 518 (Eng); Markey v Port Weller Dry Docks Ltd (1974) OJ 1914 (Ontario) 
(Markey); McKinley v BC Tel 2001 SCC 38 (Canada) (McKinley).  
14 Robb v Green (1895) 2 QB 315 (Eng CA); Merryweather v Moore [1892] M 876 ( Eng Ch Div) 
[Merryweather]; Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law in Canada (Irwin Law Inc 2008) 56-82. 
15 Bardal v Globe & Mail Ltd (1960) OJ No149, 24 DLR (2d) 140. 
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provide reasonable notice of termination, and the only losses relate to the wages and 
contractual benefits that would have accrued over the reasonable notice period.16 In 
Canada reasonable notice is determined by a series of judicially crafted factors, which in 
theory it seeks to put the worker in the position they would have been if the contract had 
been performed, and thus provide wages and contractual benefits over the length of time 
reasonably necessary to find alternative employment.17 The entitlement to reasonable 
notice of dismissal, absent cause, is the primary common law mechanism for protecting 
workers against the economic and social dislocation of dismissal.18  
II. Employment as Contract: Its Normative Value, Content and Role 
a. Freedom or Subordination?  
For some, the contractual principles described above allow the parties the individual 
freedom necessary to make the choices that best suit their personal and production 
needs. Others view employment’s contractual form as less benign.  For those critical of 
the contractual regulation of work, a significant amount of commentary proceeds from 
the idea that the description of waged work as a contractual relationship between two 
equal parties is either incomplete, and/or intentionally obfuscates the structural 
inequality of the relationship. 
From one perspective the employment contract is viewed as an institution of 
individual freedom. Although most economic and legal analysis does not directly deal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Freedland (n 8) 355. 
17 Bardal v Globe & Mail Ltd (n 14). These factors include the character of the employment, length of 
employee's service to the company, employee age, and availability of alternative employment given 
employee's training, qualifications, and training. These factors are not necessarily accurate predictors of 
the length necessary for finding alternative employment, and so in practice reasonable notice tends not to 
operate as an expectancy measure. cf Wallace v United Grain Growers (1997) 3 SCR 701 (Canada) para 
89 and 103; Lee Stuesser, ‘Wrongful Dismissal – Playing Hardball: Wallace v United Grain Growers’ 
(1997-1998) Man L J 547. 
18 Wallace v United Grain Growers (n 16) para 95; cf Justice Abella’s dissent on other grounds in Evans v 
Teamsters Local Union 31 (2008) SCC 20 (Canada) para 94. 
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with questions of property in employment, it has been a central issue for political 
theorists. Social contract theorists, starting with Locke, argue that individuals own their 
physical capacities, that is, that labour power is a form of property. ‘Every man has a 
property in his own person,’ Locke tells us. ‘This no body has any right to but himself. 
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.’19 This 
notion of self-ownership had profound political significance over the 17th, 18th and 
19th centuries. As Macpherson and Steinfeld have argued, property in the person 
upended traditional notions of citizenship in which political rights were distributed only 
on the basis of land ownership. As self-owners, everyone holds sufficient property to be 
entitled to political rights. Moreover, in contrast with the pre-20th C status-based 
system, in which one’s socioeconomic and legal rights were based on social status, once 
individuals are viewed as self-owners holding a property interest in their own labour, 
the choice to enter into an employment relationship and the terms of that relationship’s 
operation can be cast as the product of individual choice. Employer and employee are 
thus viewed as approaching each other as legal equals, because they each hold property 
that the other wishes to acquire – labour power and wages. Thus if a proprietary form of 
employment regulation constitutes slavery, the contract of employment is an institution 
of individual freedom. 
Others, however, are more critical of the contractual regulation of work. One 
strain of argument focuses on the degree to which a contractual form intentionally 
obscures the social and economic power differential between employers and employees. 
From this perspective, conceiving of employment as a contractual relationship serves to 
legitimize an inherently unequal exchange. While the parties to the employment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Locke (n 4) chapter 5, section 27a. 
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contract are theoretically equal in law, that very same legal equality, according to Otto 
Kahn-Freund, serves to mask the economic disparity between the parties that skews the 
bargaining process.20 With trademark eloquence Kahn-Freund argues that:   
[T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is 
typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of 
power. In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition 
of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be 
concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract 
of employment’.21 
Similarly Lord Wedderburn argues that the contractual model that ‘emphasises 
the personal and voluntary exchange of freely bargained promises between two parties 
equally protected by the civil law alone […] is of course suffused with an individualism 
which necessarily ignores the economic reality behind the bargain.’ 22 If the contract of 
employment masks the economic inequality between the parties, it also obscures their 
social inequality, which is rooted in the bureaucratic power held by the employing 
organization.23 As Hugh Collins has argued, even where workers are able to exert some 
market leverage in their contractual bargaining, they are likely unable to exert 
significant bureaucratic power, and are thus subject to the role allocation and 
institutional rules of hierarchy which have developed within the employing 
organization.24 The ongoing social power of the employer is deployed through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Stevens and Sons 1972) 8. 
21 ibid. 
22 K W Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (Penguin 1971) 77. 
23 Hugh Collins, ‘Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment’ (1986) 15(1) Ind 
Law J 1. 
24 ibid. 
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managerial prerogative, which legalizes the employer’s ability to direct the work 
relationship.  
For many therefore, the contract of employment is designed to legitimize an 
exchange that is structurally unequal. It is unequal in economic and bureaucratic terms, 
and indeed, to the extent that one party has the unilateral power to change some of the 
terms of the exchange during the contract’s term, it is also unequal in law.25 For Ken 
Foster, the contradictions between equality and subordination in law exist by design and 
are integral to the employment contract form. ‘The contract of employment constitutes 
the employee both as equal partner and obedient subject at one and the same time. The 
contract has both formal equality and subordination.’26 Arguing from a Marxian 
perspective, Foster suggests that the continued existence of the managerial prerogative 
is not simply an issue of inherited historical remnants but rather that ‘the duality of the 
contractual form reflects the dual nature of the labour process under capitalism itself.’27 
This argument is an emanation of a broader Marxian critique of liberal law.28 The 
common law contract of employment in its idealized form represents an almost 
paradigmatic example of liberal law. By framing the employment relationship as one of 
contract, individual and formal equality is prioritized as the basis for the law’s 
application. Formal equality constitutes workers and employing entities as 
commensurable, hiding from view the differences in lived experiences, economic needs 
and desires of the parties, rendering them simple objects of formal freedoms and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Most commentators do not characterize the contract of employment as one that is unequal in law, and 
are instead concerned with understanding the relationship between the theoretical equality of the parties 
in law to the inequality of the relationships on the market. But cf Christopher Tomlins, Law, Labor, and 
Ideology in the Early American Republic (CUP 1993) 227-28. 
26 Ken Foster, ‘From Status to Contract: Legal Form and Work Relations, 1750-1850’ (1979) 3(1) 
Warwick Law Working Papers 6. 
27 ibid.  
28 Isaac Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Autonomy” of the Law’ 
(1977) 11(3) L & Socy Rev 571. 
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political equalities.29 Socioeconomic questions are separated from the interests of the 
law, relegated to a private zone of market activity in which the law takes no content-
oriented role.30 In doing so the question of whether workers actually have the ability to 
exit is eliminated from view: whether they are in fact constrained by social and 
economic forces in their decision to accept an exploitative relationship is  hidden behind 
the formal equality of contract law. 
The critique of contract’s formal equality treats the issue of property as one of 
background rules. Robert Hale famously described the ways in which underlying 
property rights serve to limit workers bargaining power in the employment context.31 
Workers are dependent on wages for income and subsistence. They are dependent on 
employment because every other socioeconomic decision they might make to avoid 
wage dependence is conditioned by the rules of property. Access to food, access to land 
on which to grow food, acquiring the means to produce goods for oneself, all require 
property; they require land, or the means of production, or the payment of rent or a 
purchase price to a property owner. In this context, the wages and working conditions a 
worker will accept is determined by his or her level of wage dependency, which, in turn, 
is determined by the degree of access to property.32 Property therefore forms the context 
in which employment contracts are negotiated and formed, and sets the balance of 
bargaining power between the parties. It is the fact that contract is an institution of 
formal equality that is deformative because it does not acknowledge the bargaining 
power differential between them, and because it provides no analytical role for the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ibid. 575-76. 
30  ibid. 578. 
31 Robert Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-­‐Coercive State’(1923) 38 Political 
Science Q 470. 
32 ibid. 472-474. 
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different nature of the worker’s reliance on wages in comparison to employers’ reliance 
on financial productivity.  
 
b. The Relational Standard Employment Contract and Property Rights to Employment 
But if arguments over the normative value of regulating employment through 
contract rest on ideas about the underlying effect of property entitlements, analysis of 
the relational nature of the contract of employment provides more direct arguments for 
workers’ property rights in employment.  
Some scholars study the contract of employment by analysing the features that 
set it apart from other types of contract. If the paradigmatic contractual relationship is a 
bilateral executory contract of short-term duration, the paradigmatic employment 
relationship is the Standard Employment Relationship (SER) of the Fordist era.33 The 
SER has been defined as employment ‘which is continuous, long-term, fulltime, in at 
least a medium sized or large establishment […]’, focused on the male family 
breadwinner.34 Arising over the mid-20th C and sparked by collective bargaining, the 
bureaucratization and systemization of scientific management theories, and the 
development of internal labour markets, the SER emerged as the defining concept of 
employment around which labour laws, employment practices and welfare state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Piore and Sabel define Fordism, or mass production, as the substitution of highly specialized machinery 
for skilled labour, machinery operated by semi-skilled workers on assembly lines, capable of producing 
large quantities of goods. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities 
for Prosperity (Basic Books 1984) 19-20. In addition to changes to methods of production, the post-
Fordist era is characterized by the vertical disintegration of corporations, the dissolution of internal labour 
markets, a weakened trade union movement and increased wage pressure through wage competition. cf 
Matt Vidal, ‘Reworking Postfordism: Labor Process Versus Employment Relations’ (2011) 5/4 Sociology 
Compass 273.   
34 Ulrich Muckenberger, ‘Non Standard Forms of Work and the Role of Changes in Labour and Social 
Security Regulation’, (1989) 17 Intl J of Soc’y of L 387, 389.  
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regulation were built across much of the industrialized world.35 The SER is a 
contractual relationship, but in many respects it operates differently from discrete 
commercial contractual relationships. Employment relationships will often be of long-
term duration; they are open-ended, and will change over time, allowing workers to 
progress up (or down) the ranks within a single employing entity. Starting in the 1930s 
and 40s, the central features of the SER were inscribed into law for unionized workers 
through collective bargaining agreements, but for non-unionized workers they arose less 
by law and more through a series of economic and psychological norms that operated 
within a loose contractual frame. The open-ended nature of the employment contract, 
and the layers of economic and psychological expectations that guided its ongoing 
operation, created a relational legal structure that operated as a framework for 
cooperation rather than as a precise delineation of the terms of the relationship.36 It was 
a contract ‘incomplete by design’, creating an ongoing series of exchanges within the 
framework of an explicit bargain, whose adjustment was mediated by an array of social 
norms.37  
According to David Marsden, over the second half of the 20th C workers 
accepted the open-ended employment arrangement despite its exploitative potential 
because it created a number of incentive mechanisms that matched the psychological 
expectations and economic interests of workers.38 The psychological contract was two-
fold. At a broad level it rested on a series of tacit understandings of the expected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Katherine Stone and Harry Arthurs, ‘The Transformation of Employment Regimes: A Worldwide 
Challenge’ in Arthurs and Stone (n 1) 1; Alain Supiot and others, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work 
and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (OUP 2001); Judy Fudge and Leah Vosko, ‘Gender, 
Segmentation and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law, Legislation and 
Policy’ (2001) 22 Econ and Industr Democr 271. 
36 David Marsden, The Employment Relationship: Theory of Employment Systems (OUP 1999 ) 668; 
MacNeil (n 3) 900-01. 
37 Collins (n 7) 9-10. 
38 Marsden (n 36). 
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behaviour between the parties and of their respective obligations towards each other in 
regards to workplace practices. This was buttressed by professional training and social 
expectations associated with specific skill sets and job titles. These rules and 
expectations could be counted on to be respected to the extent that there was a 
relationship of trust between the parties.39 That trust, in turn, was built on economic 
incentives that provided a rationale for expecting their implementation. Labour 
economic research modeling the career wage trajectory in internal labour markets 
demonstrates that wage rates were not based solely on market rates but on a deferred 
compensation over workers’ working lives, which would see them earn a continuing 
stable and increasing wage over time, even as their productivity levels fell in later 
years.40 It was this deferred compensation scheme that created long-term economic 
stability for workers in SERs, and the reason for which they acquiesced to the 
employer’s unilateral right of control.41 It was an exchange, in the words of Alain 
Supiot, of security for subordination.42  
For workers, wage stability over long-term employment was a key feature of the 
SER bargain – the reason to accept a relationship of subordination. But outside the 
unionized sector, the courts have rarely been willing to acknowledge and enforce a 
contractual right to job security, except, in Canada, through the implied duty to provide 
reasonable notice of dismissal without cause. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s workers 
came before the common law courts making contractual arguments for compensation 
for the loss of long-term employment and the mental distress and reputational harm that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ibid. 665-66. 
40 ibid. 666-67; Katherine Stone, ‘Policing the Employment Contract Within the Nexus-of-Contract Firm’ 
(1993) 43(3) Uni of Toronto L J 353, 363 ; Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith, Modern Labor 
Economics: Theory and Public Policy (Pearson Education 1991) 430-52. 
41 ibid. 667. 
42 Supiot (n 35) 1. 
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arose from dismissal.43 Workers and academics also developed property-based 
arguments to highlight employees’ long-term investments in their employers’ 
enterprises, so as to entitle them to some form of job security. This type of argument can 
be seen in litigation over the 20th C concerning the legal nature and ownership of private 
pension plans.44 It also initially arose in the United Kingdom over whether unfair 
dismissal legislation conferred a property interest in one’s job.45 Jo Carby-Hall quotes 
Sir Diarmaid Conroy, the President of Industrial Tribunals in England and Wales in 
1968 as saying that: ‘Just as a property owner has a right in his property and when he is 
deprived he is entitled to compensation, so a long-term employee is considered to have 
a right analogous to a right or property in his job, he has a right to security and his rights 
gain in value with the years.’ 46 Property was also used as a rhetorical device to argue, 
unsuccessfully, that wrongful dismissal could amount to an improper taking that should 
be remedied by reinstatement. 47  
More recently some scholars have been making the case for job security and worker 
participation in firm restructuring by arguing that workers are not a fixed factor of 
production, but are rather long-term investors akin to corporate shareholders. This 
argument rests on the internal labour market analysis described above, which suggests 
that workers invest in developing firm-specific knowledge for which they will not gain 
compensation on the labour market, and agree to a lower than opportunity wage at early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 cf Magee v Channel Seventynine Ltd (1976) 15 OR (2d) 185 (Ontario) (Magee); Racine v CJRC Radio 
Capitale Ltee (1977) 17 OR (2d) 370 (Ontario) (Racine); McMinn v Town of Oakville (1977) 19 OR (2d) 
366 (Ontario) (McMinn); Delmotte v John Labatt Ltd et al (1978) OJ No 3625 (Ontario) (Delmotte); 
Clancy v Family Services Bureau (1978) OJ No 1017 (Ontario) (Clancy); White v Triarch (1979) OJ 1047 
(Ontario) (White). 
44 Elizabeth Shilton, ‘Gifts or Rights? A Legal History of Employment Pension Plans in Canada’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of Toronto 2011) 63-77; chapter 5. 
45 Paul White, ‘Unfair Dismissal Legislation and Property Rights: Some Reflections’ (1985) 16 (4) 
Industr Relations  J 98. 
46 Jo Carby-Hall, ‘Redundancy’ (2000) 42 Managerial L 1; 8. 
47 Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (Clarendon UP 1992) 88.  
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stages of their careers on the promise of wage stability in their later working years.48 By 
virtue of their long-term investments and deferred compensation, employees are akin to 
other residual corporate owners, placing their interests in the firm on par with those of 
corporate shareholders.49 For this reason corporate directors’ fiduciary duties should be 
exercised for the benefit of workers as much as for shareholders.  
 
III. The Employment Contract as Property Exchange 
What is often missing from analyses of the contractual form for regulating work, 
however, is consideration of the property interests that are at the core of the wage-work 
exchange. The employment contract is fundamentally about the exchange of the human 
capacity to labour in exchange for wages, so that employers may use that capacity to 
create profit.50 It is a lease of a worker’s labour power to an employer for a specific 
period of time, and in regards to certain types of tasks. In this sense property not only 
provides the background rules against which the parties’ contract, it is the subject of the 
contract itself.  
In theory one of the central distinctions between the contractual regulation of 
work and a proprietary form of regulation, is that the t contract places limits on what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 cf Wanjiru Njoya, Property in Work: The Employment Relationship in the Anglo-American Firm 
(Ashgate 2007); Simon Deakin and others., ‘Partnership, Ownership and Control: The Impact of 
Corporate Governance on Employment Relations’(2002) 24 Employee Rel. 335; Janis Sarra, ‘Corporate 
Governance Reform: Recognition of Workers’ Equitable Investments in the Firm’ (1999) 32 Can  Bus L J 
384; Margaret M Blair, ‘For Whom Should Corporations be Run? An Economic Rationale for 
Stakeholder Management’ (1998) 31 Long Range Planning 195; Thomas Donaldson and Lee E Preston, 
‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy 
Mgmt Rev 65; Katherine Stone, ‘Policing Employment Contracts within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm’ 
(1993) 45 Uni of Toronto L J 353; Jonathan R Macey & Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Corporate Stakeholders: A 
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the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers’ 
(1991) 69 N C L Rev 1189. 
49 Blair (n 48) 195. 
50 Judy Fudge, ‘The Limits of Good Faith in the Contract of Employment: From Addis to Vorvis to 
Wallace and Back Again?’ (2007), 32 Queen's L J 529. 
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employers purchase of workers’ labour power, and the rights of control they thereby 
acquire.51 There are two principal ways in which this has occurred. The first is through 
restrictions placed on the managerial prerogative, and the second is through limitations 
on working time.  
Under an employment contract, employers gain not only workers’ time and the 
product of their capacities, but the right to control, possess, use and profit from that 
labour power through the managerial prerogative. As will be explored below, the 
managerial prerogative has morphed over time from a proprietary right over labour 
power, to a more limited right of control purchased through contract. Temporal 
limitations have also been central in law to determining the scope of the employment 
contract, and to maintaining the theoretical notion that one can sell one’s labour power 
without selling oneself. Temporal limitations have historically operated to determine the 
length of the parties’ obligations towards one another, and the time workers had to 
themselves. But, as we will see below, working time limitation are inherently politically 
questions, and the limits historically imposed have tended to emerge not from 
negotiated terms of individual employment contracts – not from anything inherent in the 
contractual form – but rather from surrounding patterns of production, from union 
activism and legislated standards.  
 
a. The History of the Managerial Prerogative: From Property to Contract Right  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The differences posited between property and contract regimes, for instance, relate to the ability to exit 
the relationship, and to the limitations placed on employers’ rights of control. Under a proprietary regime 
workers transfer all of their rights to their labour to their employers, and for this reason forfeit the ability 
to exit the relationship. By contrast, under a contractual regime worker retain the legal right to leave the 
relationship if they choose, because both parties are juridical equals. The second difference, in theory, is 
that under a proprietary model employers hold unlimited power to control, dispose and alienate workers’ 
labour, whereas under a contractual regime, those rights of use and control are limited by the nature and 
terms of the employment contract. cf Pateman (n 4) 70-72.  
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The managerial prerogative, as explained above, provides employers with the 
right to direct the workforce on issues concerning the manner of production. As the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal stated in Stein v. British Columbia (Housing 
Management Commission): 
An employer has a right to determine how his business shall be conducted. He 
may lay down any procedures he thinks is advisable as long as they are neither 
contrary to law, nor dishonest, nor dangerous to the health of the employees and 
are within the ambit of the job for which any particular employee was hired. It is 
not for the employee nor for the court to consider the wisdom of the procedures. 
The employer is the boss […].52 
Since the 1990s the Canadian courts have explained the managerial prerogative 
as an implied contractual term of the employment relationship.53 By presenting the 
managerial prerogative as an implied contractual term, the courts suggest that the right 
of control is something purchased through an employment contract – it is a term of the 
bargain agreed to by the parties. Some have argued that more than the right to use 
workers’ labour, it is the right of control that is the primary benefit acquired by 
employers through an employment contract. ‘In return for the payment of wages, the 
employer bargains for the right to direct the workforce to perform in the most 
productive way.’54  
But prior to the 1990s, in Canada at least, the managerial prerogative was not 
expressed as something purchased by the employer, or as an implied contractual term. 
There was no discussion in the case law of whence this right of control came from or of 
what legal authority provided employers with such a prerogative. It was, instead, simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Stein v BC (Housing Management Commission) (1992) 65 BCLR (d) 181 (BCCA) (Stein). 
53 Farber (n 9). 
54 Hugh Collins, Employment Law (Oxford UP 2010) 10.  
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presumed to exist. Some scholars trace employers’ right of control and duty of 
obedience to the pre-contractual system of master and servant law in England. The 
traditional narrative in the field is that a contractual method for regulating work 
emerged in the 19th C in tandem with the Industrial Revolution and the general spread 
of free-will contracting. Scholars such as Philip Selznick and Alan Fox, however, argue 
that the contractual regulation of work never in fact shed the vestiges of status and 
subordination that defined the master and servant system.55  They argue that the master 
and servant duty of obedience was absorbed into the contractual framework in the 19th 
C, so as to allow employers to retain managerial control.56 Ulrich Mukenberger and 
Simon Deakin state that ‘the principle of an open-ended managerial prerogative to 
organize work and set the terms and conditions of employment [was] grafted on to the 
concept of contract’ in the 19th C.57 The fact of subordination and the ability to control 
the workforce became the definitional hallmark of the employment relationship, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The law of master and servant law was a statutory regime for regulating employment first enacted in 
England in the wake of the Black Death of the 14th century. It created a penal system of compulsory 
labour, designed to regulate labour mobility and wage rates. It applied to the waged-work relations of 
servants in husbandry (agricultural workers and household servants), labourers, and artisans. In the 16th 
century the system was reorganized with enactment of the Statute of Artificers in 1543, and was thereafter 
interwoven with the Laws of Settlement and the Poor Laws in the 17th century. Together these statutes 
created a comprehensive system for regulating the labour market, through centralized wage-setting, 
prohibitions on wage competition amongst employers, control of labour mobility and parish poor relief. 
While statutory in nature, the laws of master and servant were bolstered by a complex body of case law, 
as well as particular customs and practices from different industries. The enforcement of this body of law 
was the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Worker violations of their employment contracts could be 
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and into the early 19th century a series of newer statutes were enacted to regulate the work of emerging 
industrial occupations, just as other central features of the master and servant system began to fall into 
disuse. These newer statutes were mostly designed to extend and clarify the coverage of master and 
servant law to artisanal craft work, but they also increased the disciplinary and punitive aspects of the 
system. Prosecutions under the master and servant statutes increased throughout the 19th century, right up 
until the repeal of the penal sanctions in 1875. The master and servant statutes were exported across the 
British Empire, and put to work in disciplining colonial subjects. cf Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (eds), 
Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955 (University of North Carolina 
Press 2004). 
56Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 132; Alan Fox, 
Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (Faber and Faber 1974) 184. 
57 Ulrich Muckenberger and Simon Deakin, ‘From Deregulation to a European Floor of Rights: Labour 
Law, Flexibilisation and the European Single Market’ (1989) Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches und 
Internationales Arbeits und Sozialrect 153,57. 
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distinguishing it from other forms of commercial exchanges and bringing it under the 
legal auspices of the laws of work.58 The result, according to Fox, is a ‘[…] legal 
construction […] put upon the contract of employment which left it virtually 
unrecognizable as contract.’59  
The master and servant duty of obedience was intrinsically related to employers’ 
rights of ownership over workers’ labour power. It has changed over time however, and 
an examination of its evolution is suggestive of the modern form of the managerial 
prerogative. Until the turn of the 19th C, as Blackstone tells us, employment was 
primarily conceived of as a private, personal relationship. Domestic and agricultural 
servants were members of the employer’s household.60 Robert Steinfeld explains that 
employers’ rights over their workers’ labour stemmed from their positions as head of 
the household, through which they could exert both paternal rule and care.61 Over the 
18th century, as the theory of possessive individualism began to take hold in England, 
the employment relationship was reconceived as a transaction concluded between 
consenting individuals.62 But the transaction itself continued to provide the master with 
rights of use and control of their servants’ general labour power. 
As a result of this voluntary transaction between two autonomous individuals, 
the hirer of labor had the legal right to control, use, and enjoy the other’s 
personal energies for the term or purposes specified in the agreement. […] One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Servants and Independent Contractors’, (1951) 14(4) Modern LR 504. In Canada 
the legal test surrounding the definition of ‘employee’ has evolved beyond the strict application of the 
control test, but it remains a significant part of the conceptual inquiry. Cf Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker and 
Leah Vosko, The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers, (Ottawa: Law Commission of 
Canada 2002) 50-92. 
59 Fox (n 57) 183. 
60 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (1753) Bk 1, ch 14 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140> accessed 1 January 2015. 
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62 ibid. 
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party traded away to the other the property in his own labor for wages or 
compensation.63 
 
Over the course of the 18th and 19th C, however, as industrial manufacturing 
grew in prominence in England, employers’ right of control took on a new significance. 
As industrial production grew in the 19th C, manufacturing was increasingly centralized 
under a single employing enterprise or individual. Rather than contracting for labour 
through an intermediary, such as a foreman, business owners increasingly owned the 
factories in which workers worked, the materials and tools needed for production, and 
were the direct employers of the labour force needed to transform the raw materials into 
physical goods.64 With manufacturing enterprises as the owner of the tools of 
production, the materials of production and the labour needed for production, labour 
was transformed into a commodity input into the production process. And as employers 
owned all of the inputs into a production process, so they therefore owned its outputs. 
From such ownership employers’ ability to organize production to suit their business 
needs flowed logically, including the ability to direct its workforce: 
From the instant [the worker] steps into the workshop, the use-value of his 
labour-power […] belongs to the capitalist. By the purchase of labour-power, the 
capitalist incorporates labour, as a living ferment, with the lifeless constituents 
of the product. From his point of view, the labour-process is nothing more than 
the consumption of the commodity purchase, ie, of labour-power; but this 
consumption cannot be effected except by supplying the labour power with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 ibid. 80. 
64 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (Penguin 1968) 18-36; Simon Deakin, ‘The 
Evolution of the Contract of Employment, 1900-1950’ in Robert Salais and Noel Whiteside (eds), 
Governance, Industry and Labour Markets in Britain and France (Routledge 2005) 208. 
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means of production. The labour-process is a process between things that the 
capitalist has purchased, things that become his property.65  
 The managerial prerogative, therefore, rests on concepts of status and on 
employers’ proprietary ownership over the inputs and outputs of their businesses. 
Although currently framed as an implied contractual term, it is intrinsically linked to the 
employers’ right to control their property which is given effect through legal ideas such 
as the implied duties of obedience, loyalty, fidelity and confidentiality.  
The managerial prerogative has been tempered by contract over time. Starting in the 
late 19th C the courts began to narrow the scope of orders that employees had to obey to 
ones that were related to the employee’s particular job functions.66 And as of the mid-
20th C, the Canadian courts also began to suggest that because the employment 
relationship is contractual in nature, an employer’s ability to make unilateral workplace 
decisions through the managerial prerogative applies only to non-essential terms and 
conditions of employment. An employer may not make unilateral alterations to the 
essential terms of the employment contract without the employee’s acceptance.67 What 
constitutes an essential term, however, is notoriously slippery. According to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the court must look to what would be considered essential by 
reasonable people at the time of contract.68 Generally, demotions, significant alterations 
to wages and methods of calculating income are considered alterations to essential 
terms, which requires an employee’s agreement to effect, in the absence of which the 
employee may considered themselves constructively dismissed.69 This potentially 
important limitation on the employer’s managerial prerogative is significantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Marx (n 4) 283-305. 
66 cf Price v Mouat (1862) 11 CB (NS) (Eng). 
67 Hill v Peter Gorman Ltd (1957) DLR (2d) 124 (Ontario ) (Peter Gorman); Farber (n 10). 
68 ibid. 
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attenuated, however, by the employer’s ability to dismiss for any reason with reasonable 
notice. Employee consent to contract variation, therefore, occurs in the shadow of job 
loss. 
b. Labour Power as Commodity and Changing Notions of Working Time 
The second way in which employers’ rights of control have historically been limited 
is through definitions of working time. Other than circumscribing the managerial 
prerogative, the primary way in which the courts have imposed limitations on the rights 
acquired by employers over workers’ labour power is by explaining the employment 
contract as a sale, or lease, for specific amounts of time. That idea that the employment 
contract is a purchase of working time is what allows for a distinction between workers’ 
own time, and the time they owe their employers. Such a distinction is vital to create a 
legal distinction between the sale of oneself, and the sale of one’s labour power. 
Time has always been a central limiting feature of the waged work relationship, but 
its conceptualization and legal use has shifted in different eras. Under the pre-20th C 
master and servant system, as Steinfeld explains, workers sold their whole labour power 
for the entire term of the contract – not just their physical or intellectual labour, but their 
whole labour power. The sale was not for the work day, but for all times of the day and 
night, for the duration of the contract even where work schedules were set by statute.70 
The idea that workers sold their total labour power was facilitated by the concept of the 
annual hire presumption. Under the terms of the 16th C Statute of Artificers and later 
master and servant statutes, employment contracts in England were presumed to be of 
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annual duration unless of specified otherwise.71 The annual hire contract operated 
similarly to a modern day tenancy agreement, renewing itself annually unless brought to 
an end by with three months notice by either party before the end of the contract’s term. 
The employment contract therefore leased to employers workers’ entire labour power 
over an annual hire contract, or over the express term set by the parties. The idea that 
waged employment differed from indentured servitude was premised on the idea that it 
was temporally limited by its fixed duration. 
The presumption of annual hire began to lose practical force in the late 18th and 
early 19th C in manufacturing work, in tandem with the movement of production out of 
the home and into industrial manufacturing centres. As E P Thompson argues, by the 
19th C in many industries labour was deployed less towards the accomplishment of 
tasks, set by the seasons in agriculture or specific jobs under the putting-out system, and 
more towards a systematized work day and work shift determined by the need to 
maintain continuous production lines:72  
Those who are employed experience a distinction between their employer’s time 
and their ‘own’ time. And the employer must use the time of his labour, and see 
it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time, when reduced to money is 
dominant. Time is now currency: it is not passed but spent. 73   
In this context manual and industrial workers were often hired under shorter-
term contracts on shift schedules determined by employers.74 At the same time as the 
annual hire presumption was slowly displaced over the 19th C, in England the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 ibid. s 2. 
72 E P Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’ (1967) 38 Past and Present 56. 
73 ibid. 61. 
74 Sanford Jacoby, ‘The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: 
An Historical Analysis’ (1982) 5 Comp Lab L J 85, 97-99. By the beginning of the 19th C domestic 
servants were considered to work on contracts that could be terminated by one’s month’s notice by either 
party. The presumption continued to hold sway over white-collar employment until the end of the 19th 
century, however, when the presumption was abandoned in England, Canada and the United States.  
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stepped in with new regulations over the working time of women and children, just as 
trade unions agitated for greater limits over the working day and work week.75 The 
annual hire presumption was fully displaced in law at the turn of the 20th C in Canada, 
England and the United States, as indefinite duration slowly employment emerged to 
take its place in law. As indefinite duration employment became the norm, the common 
law courts began to suggest that employers’ purchase of labour time was restricted to 
the work day and work week, based on the presumed intentions of the parties. The 
presumed intentions of the parties were often derived from an examination of  standard 
industry practices regarding working time. 
That changing notions of labour time were imposing new limits on the property 
interests employers acquired through contract was visible in a series of cases decided by 
the courts of England and Canada between the 1890s and the 1920s.76 In the early 
decades of the 20th C, employers came before the courts arguing for proprietary rights 
over workers’ time, skill and income earned outside of work. In doing so, they relied on 
older concepts of exclusive service to argue for an entire proprietary right of control 
over workers’ labour power. The courts, however, began to limit employers’ proprietary 
rights to those that were impliedly or expressly purchased through the employment 
contract. In the 1904 Ontario case of Sheppard Publishing Co. v Harkins, for example, 
an employer argued that the worker had violated the exclusive service provision of their 
employment contract by engaging in side projects. But rather than requesting damages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Factory Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will IV, c. 103; The Factories Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict c. 15; Factories Act 1847, 
10 & 11 Vict c. 29; The Factory and Workshop Act 1878, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 16. 
76 Judicial consideration of the scope of labour power sold through an employment contract was not 
focused only on questions of time. Cases also arose regarding whether employers owned workers’ skills, 
knowledge and relationships developed during their employment, as well as to issues surrounding 
inventions made by employees. cf Claire Mummé, “That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind: The 
contract of employment at common law in Ontario, 1890-1979”, Unpublished dissertation, Osgoode Hall 
Law School at York University, 2013. 
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for breach, the employer sought an accounting of the income the employee had earned 
from his other jobs.77 The court noted that while ‘[n]o doubt the rights of the master 
over the person as well as the time and labour of his servant were much more extensive 
formerly than they are today,’78 such older principles were inconsistent with modern 
day notions of liberty and citizenship. A covenant to provide all one’s time and attention 
to an employer’s business could not mean that the worker was bound to provide services 
at all hours of the day or night, or in times designated for rest and relaxation. ‘To hold 
otherwise’, Justice Anglin stated, ‘would be in effect to place the employee of the 
present day in a position little, if at all, better than that of the villein of former times.79 
But, the court noted, although employers could not claim any proprietary rights over 
workers’ labour outside of work, an employment contract did serve to provide 
employers with ownership over workers’ labour during the time the employer 
purchased. The court noted that the employee was required to work diligently for his 
employer’s interests during ‘such hours as it is customary for men in positions such as 
his to work.80 The court held that the rule remained that the ‘money obtained by the 
servant by the sale of time and labour which belonged to his mater, [was], in 
contemplation of the law, the proceeds of his master’s property.’81 Any income an 
employee made during the time sold to their employer was employer’s property.82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Sheppard Publishing Co v Harkins (1905), 9 OLR 504 (On HC Gen Div) (Sheppard). 
78 ibid. para 9. 
79 ibid. para 11. 
80 ibid. para 11. 
81 ibid. para 15. 
82 It seems unlikely that the courts would now permit an accounting for employee wages or profits made 
in breach of contract. This is Stephen Waddams view. He states that, ‘the courts have not held the 
employer entitled to the benefits derived by the employee from the alternative use of time, albeit in 
breach of contract. To permit such a claim would be to give the employer a sort of proprietary interest in 
the employee’s services: this concept has, since the nineteenth century, been generally unacceptable […]’. 
cf Steven Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law (CUP 2003) 114. However, although not ordering an 
accounting of the employee’s side profit, the Canadian Supreme Court has recently held that losses that 
flowed from the breach of the duties of loyalty and good faith by a non-fiduciary employee entitled it to 
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Determining what amount of time was sold to one’s employer was a matter of contract – 
of the presumed intentions of the parties. And in the absence of express terms, the 
presumed intentions of the parties could be inferred from evidence concerning the usual 
work day and work week in the industry. 83 Increasingly therefore, the courts suggested 
that the employment contract was premised on emerging industry standards of working 
time. 
By the 1930s and 40s, however, judicial discussions regarding the nature of the 
labour purchase in an employment contract began to recede. Over these decades, 
statutory restrictions, international labour standards and collective bargaining 
introduced further controls over the work day and work week.84 At the same time the 
Standard Employment Relationship (SER) became the paradigmatic form of male 
unionized and white-collar employment, anchoring in law the psychological, social and 
economic norms associated with long-term employment.85 During the mid-20th C 
Fordist era, a standardized work day and work week was increasingly the norm, which, 
in turn, served to implicitly limit employers’ acquisition of property rights over 
workers’ labour. ‘By establishing standard working days, defined by hours not output, 
employers could only set tasks that could be performed in the allotted time.’86 Thus over 
the mid-20th C labour time was increasingly standardized, which endowed employers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recover lost profits arising from the employee’s contract breach,, to the tune of $1,483,239. RBC 
Dominion Securities Inc v Merrill Lynch Canada Inc (2008) SCC 54. 
83 Thwaites v McKillop (1925) 29 OWN 122 (Ont SC Ap Div) (Thwaites).  
84 International Labour Organization, Hours of Work (Industry Convention, 1919 ,1) and Hours of Work 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (30). 
85 Fudge and Vosko (n 35) 271. As Fudge and Vosko argue, however, only part of the work force was 
ever employed in SERs, while a reserve contingent workforce of women and minority workers were used 
to offset production fluctuations. 
86 Jill Rubery, Kevin Ward, Damian Grimshaw and Huw Beynon, ‘Working Time, Industrial Relations 
and the Employment Relationship’ (2005) 41(1) Time & Society 89,91. As Rubery and others state, ‘[t]he 
divide between standard hours and non-standard hours further constrained employers, as employees at a 
minimum needed to be compensated by extra payments to give up “free” time, particularly if the hours 
worked were at times regarded by wider society as particularly unsocial.’ 
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with rights of control, use and profit over the working day, but left workers with a set 
period of their own time.  
This distinction between working time and one’s own time served placed limits 
on the scope of labour commodification. But, as can be seen in the early annual hire 
presumption, working time restrictions are not intrinsically a product of the contractual 
regulation of work. Rather a standard working week emerged in the mid-20th C 
response to certain industrial production patterns, to political and collective bargaining 
campaigns by unions, and through legislated norms, just as the annual hire presumption 
first emerged in relationship to agricultural planting patterns and the related need to 
maintain a consistent work force in seasonal industries. Nonetheless by setting clear 
boundaries between work time and workers’ own time, the emergence of a standardized 
work week in the Fordist era had a profound impact on the nature of waged work. It 
provided implicit contractual limits in law on employers’ purchase of workers’ labour 
power; employers owned only that time which they purchased, providing workers with 
time away from work in which to live.87 
  But as the norms of the Fordist era have crumbled since the 1980s, any social 
consensus over a standardized work week is receding.88 Since the 1980s and 90s the 
SER has been displaced in labour market centrality, with a corresponding increase in 
part time employment, short-term contracts, temporary work arrangements and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 cf Piore and Sabel (n 33) 19-20. 
88 Such set working days and weeks were never afforded to all workers. Ann Porter argues that 
governmental officials viewed the role of women as acting as a labour market reserve, to enter the 
workforce only ‘under emergency conditions’. At an aggregate level, as Fudge and Vosko argue, the 
higher wages earned by unionized workers over the mid-century were sustainable by providing lower 
wages and less job security to non-unionized workers. cf Ann Porter, ‘Women and Income Security in the 
Post-War Period: The Case of Unemployment Insurance, 1945-1962’, (1993) 31 Labour/Le Travail 111; 
Fudge and Vosko (n 85) 276. 
28                                       Political Economy and Law: A Handbook 
 
atypical forms of work.89 In some countries statutory restrictions on working-time have 
been loosened to permit for greater employer flexibility.90 The number of women in the 
workforce continues to increase, and as dual income families become the norm in 
Western countries, new questions are emerging about work-life balance and how to 
manage the responsibilities of work and home.91 Control over working time is at the 
heart of contestations over the nature of flexibilized work and work-life balance. As 
Rubery and others argue, ‘the wage-effort bargain, and the division between work and 
non-work time are inherently contested aspects of the employment relationship.’92 This 
contestation concerns who will control the duration of working days, the timing of work 
and the location of work.93 It is fundamentally a dispute over control of workers’ labour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Sonia McKay, Steve Jefferys, Anna Paraksevopoulou, Janoj Keles, Study on Precarious Work and 
Social Rights, Working Lives Research Institute (European Commission 2012); cf Andrea Noack and 
Leah Vosko, Precarious Jobs in Ontario: Mapping Dimensions of Labour Insecurity by Workers 
Location and Context (Law Commission of Ontario 2011); Judy Fudge and Leah Vosko, Precarious 
Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (McGill-Queen’sUP 2005); European 
Commission Community Research, Precarious Employment in Europe: A Comparative Study of Labour 
Market and related Risks in Flexible Economies, Final Report (2005) 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/citizens/docs/kina21250ens_final_esope.pdf> > accessed 1 January 2015. 
90 Mark Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards, (Queen’s-
McGill UP 2009) 117-18. 
91 Linda Dickens, ‘Equality and Work-Life Balance: What’s Happening at the Workplace’ (2006) 35(4) 
Industr L J 445. 
92 Rubery and others (n 86) 92. 
93 Peter Berg, Eileen Appelbaum, Tom Bailey and Arne Kalleberg, ‘Contesting Time: International 
Comparisons of Employee Control of Working Time’ (2004) 57(3) Industr and Labor Relat Rev 331, 
333-334. As some scholars have begun to argue, lying just below the surface of work-life policy debates 
are fundamental questions about the ways in which current forms of work, such as immaterial labour, 
produce value in late modern capitalism as well as the commodification of social reproductive tasks. 
Hardt and Negri’s define ‘immaterial labour’ simply as ‘labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a 
service, cultural product, knowledge or communication.’ This includes three types of immaterial labour: 
informationalized industrial production that incorporates communication technologies; analytical and 
symbolic tasks, and the production and manipulation of affect – labour in the bodily mode. One of the 
central questions to which these scholars tend is whether and to what extent immaterial labour, in its 
different forms, confuses and collapses the concepts of use value and exchange value, and to what extent 
labour time continues to provide any useful economic measure outside of physical labour. cf Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard UP 2000); cf Lisa Adkins, ‘Feminism after Measure’(2009) 
10(3) Feminist Theory 323; Linda McDowell, Working Bodies: Interactive Service Employment and 
Workplace Identities (Wiley-Blackwell 2009); Auβheben, ‘Keep on Smiling: Questions on Immaterial 
Labour’ (2006) 14 Auβheben 23; Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: The Commercialization 
of Human Feeling (Uni of California Press 2003); Nick Dyer-Witherford, ‘Empire, Immaterial Labor, the 
New Combinations and the Global Worker’ (2001) 13(3/4) Rethinking Marxism 70; Mauricio Lazzarato, 
‘Immaterial Labour’ in Michael Hardt and Paolo Virno (eds), Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential 
Politics  (Uni of Minneapolis Press 1996). A few legal scholars have also begun to investigate the effects 
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power, and suggests that to the extent that the mid-20th century working-time consensus 
is dissipating, traditional legal methods which limited employers’ rights of control over 
labour power are also dissolving. Thus, as the number of unionized workers employed 
under collective bargaining agreements drops, as statutory restrictions on working time 
are repealed, and as production practices shift towards flexibilized work arrangements, a 
social and legal consensus around hours of work appears to be crumbling.  
  There is conflicting data in developed countries on the percentage of workers 
working in non-standard work arrangements, the percentage of workers outside of the 
standard work week, and whether and how the numbers vary across different 
industries.94 In general, however, over the last 20 years communication technologies 
have permitted some types of work to move out of the office, into the home, the coffee 
shop, the library, etc.95 In many service-based industries, employers are moving onto 24 
hour schedules with multiple work shifts throughout the day. For professional white 
collar employees this work-creep takes the form of requiring workers to remain 
permanently on-call for their employers and clients, reachable through their cell phones 
and laptops at all times of the day and night.96 For more precarious service workers it is 
the lack of control over the timing of work schedules that is the most pressing 
phenomenon, as the organization of daily life revolves around the potential for work and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of such questions on legal regulation. cf Judy Fudge, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Scope of Labour Law: 
Domestic Work, Social Reproduction and Jurisdiction’ (2014) 22(1) Feminist Legal Studies 1; Emily 
Grabham, ‘Beyond Flexibility? Legal Form and Temporal Rationalities in UK Worklife Balance Law’, 
http://www.upf.edu/gredtiss/_pdf/2013-LLRNConf_Grabham.pdf, accessed February 21st, 2015. 
94 cf Peter Auer and Sandrine Cazes, Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility: Evidence from 
industrialized countries (ILO 2003); Koen Breedveld, ‘The Double Myth of Flexibilization:Trends in 
scattered work hours, differences in time-sovereignty’ (1998) 7(1) Time & Society 129; Cynthia Cranford, 
Leah Vosko, and Nancy Zukewich, ‘Precarious Employment in the Canadian Labour Market: A statistical 
portrait’ (2003) 3 Just Labour 6. 
95 Melissa Gregg, Work’s Intimacy (Polity 2011).  
96 A binding agreement has recently been reached in France between some unions and employers 
allowing workers to disconnect from remote communication tools so that they may spend the regulatory 
11 hours of daily rest uninterrupted. cf Les Échos, Mails, SMS, téléphone : Syntec reconnaît le droit des 
cadres à la déconnexion  <http://www.lesechos.fr/06/04/2014/lesechos.fr/0203425126713_mails--sms--
telephone---syntec-reconnait-le-droit-des-cadres-a-la-deconnexion.htm>  accessed 1 January 2015. 
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the limited capacity to plan forward.97 In this context, worrying and planning for 
potential work ends up taking over off-work time as well. Other 21st century phenomena 
are also challenging the traditional boundaries between work and life. In particular, 
workers’ non-work online activities can now be viewed by employers with relative ease, 
such that workers may increasingly face discipline and dismissal for things said and 
done on their own time. In all of these ways, the traditional boundaries between one’s 
own time, and work time are beginning to crumble. As Melissa Gregg argues, ‘[i]f 
modernist notions of labour hinged on a set number of hours for work, often conducted 
at a set physical location, the fact that labour now escapes spatial and temporal measure 
poses obvious problems for defining work limits.’98  
The absence of judicial concern for maintaining working-time limitations is 
visible in current common law wrongful dismissal claims. The British Columbia 
Supreme Court recently considered a wrongful dismissal claim from a young lawyer. 
Amongst other instances of misconduct claimed as cause, the employer argued that the 
employee was not always immediately reachable to his supervisor through phone or 
email. He was told he needed to be available 24/7, and that he could not take a lunch 
break if there was work to be done, but he nonetheless insisted on leaving the office 
over the lunch hour and not answering his phone. The court concluded that the claimant 
was insubordinate, because he did not accept that his employer had the right to 
determine how to run his business. When the employer’s expectations in terms of the 
claimant’s hours of work and availability were explained to him, he rejected them as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Michelle Chen, ‘The Tyranny of the On-Call Schedule: Hourly Injustice in Retail Labour’(The Nation, 
19 March 2014) <http://www.thenation.com/blog/178879/tyranny-call-schedule-hourly-injustice-retail-
labor?utm_content=buffer5a5aa&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
>. 
98 Melissa Gregg, ‘Presence Bleed: Performing Professionalism Online’ in Mark Banks, Rosalind Gill and 
Stephanie Taylor (eds), Theorizing Cultural Work: Labour, Continuity and Change in Cultural and 
Creative Industries (Routledge 2013) 122. 
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unreasonable and refused to obey. But, as the court stated, ‘it was not for [the employer] 
to justify work terms to [the employee].’99 What was noticeably absent from this 
decision was any question of whether it should have been a term of the contract that the 
employee could take a lunch hour, or any consideration of whether it was unreasonable 
for an employee to turn off his or her phone over night. According to the court, the 
nature of legal work was that it required constant availability to one’s employer, and to 
so refuse was insubordinate and a breach of the employment contract. What this type of 
analysis demonstrates is that the terms of the employment contract are determined on 
what the courts assume are the reasonable expectations of the parties. These 
expectations emerge from standard market practices, including average working times, 
and are then read in as terms of the contract. Thus, to the extent that a social consensus 
over working time dissipates, that fewer workers are operating under collective 
bargaining agreements, and statutory working time limitations are under threat, contract 
law in itself, in the absence of expressly negotiated terms, provides no mechanism by 
which to maintain limitations on working time.  
Thus although some limitations have been placed through contract on an employer’s 
ability to change the terms of an employment contract through limitations on the 
managerial prerogative, and although there are some limits on the type of control 
employers may exercise, there are increasingly fewer boundaries placed around the 
terms of workers’ lease of their labour power. Insofar as working time extends, and 
workers are to be constantly available to their employers, the zone of managerial control 
itself extends, endowing employers with a greater degree of power over the labour 
power they acquire through contract. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Gichuru v Smith (cob Howard Smith & Co) (2013) BCSC 895 (British Columbia) para 166. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Over the course of these pages I have attempted to lay out the relationship between 
property and contract in employment. The main argument of this paper is that issues 
surrounding property are not simply a matter of background rules, but are instead 
fundamental to an understanding of the operation of the employment contract itself. The 
reason for this is simply that the employment contract is a legal vehicle for exchanging 
rights over property in workers’ labour. One of the primary innovations of the 
contractual method of regulating work, in theory, is that it places limits on the rights 
acquired by employers over workers’ labour power, such that the lease is temporally 
bound and limited in scope. The two primary methods by which this is said to occur are 
through limits on the managerial prerogative to manage the workplace, and limitations 
working time. As the above analysis suggests, however, limitations on the managerial 
prerogative are minimal at best, given employers’ residual right to dismiss with 
reasonable notice, and contractual notions, although central to the analysis of 
contractual variations, do little in practice to protect workers from unilateral alteration 
of terms. Similarly, as described above, the boundaries created by temporal limitations 
on working time have historically emerged from market practices, through collective 
bargaining and statutory restrictions. But as those restrictions are loosened through 
changing market practices, the decreasing strength of trade unions and statutory 
deregulation, in many types of employment working time no longer erects a contractual 
boundary between one’s own lives and the time we have leased to our employers. 
Contract provides no method of challenging the creeping extension of working time and 
employer control, such that in the absence of legal mechanisms like statutory regulation, 
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the distinctions between the temporary lease of one’s labour power and the general 
alienation of one’s self becomes more tenuous.  
What this analysis suggests is two-fold: first, that limitations placed employer rights 
over labour power are not inherent to the contractual form, but are rather embedded in 
broader social and economic processes that change over time, given content and form 
through judicial choices at different junctures. The second conclusion is that property 
and contract are not separate and opposed forms of work regulation. Rather the modern 
contractual regulation of employment is intrinsically enmeshed with questions of 
property in labour power. In this sense, the question of whether or not the contractual 
regulation of work is an institution of freedom or subordination is not dependent solely 
on the legal equality constructed between the parties, but also on the degree to which it 
limits the proprietary rights employers acquire over labour power at any given time. 
 
 
